The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293 (2015)
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Abstract

I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.

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2013

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10.1111/phpr.12063

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Joel Smith
University of Manchester

Citations of this work

Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds.Elijah Chudnoff - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):276-298.
Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.
The Part-Whole Perception of Emotion.Trip Glazer - 2018 - Consciousness and Cognition 58:34-43.
The Look of Another Mind.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1023-1061.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Siegel - 2010 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Perception and Its Objects.Bill Brewer - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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