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The Non-arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman
Utilitas 11 (2):178-193 (1999)
Abstract
James Lenman is critical of my claim that moral requirements are requirements of reason. I argue that his criticisms miss their target. More importantly, I argue that the anti-rationalism that informs Lenman's criticisms is itself implausible.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value.Michael Smith - 2002 - Philosophical Issues 12 (1):329-347.
Exploring the Implications of the Dispositional Theory of Value.Michael Smith - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):329 - 347.
It is Possible Morality Based on Sympathy?Juan Carlos Suárez Villegas - 2011 - Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 10 (1):85–96.
References found in this work
Michael Smith and the Daleks: Reason, Morality, and Contingency.James Lenman - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (2):164-177.
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