Three facets of consciousness

Axiomathes 12 (1-2):55-85 (2001)
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Abstract

Over the past century phenomenology has ably analyzed the basic structuresof consciousness as we experience it. Yet recent philosophy of mind, lookingto brain activity and computational function, has found it difficult to makeroom for the structures of subjectivity and intentionality that phenomenologyhas appraised. In order to understand consciousness as something that is bothsubjective and grounded in neural activity, we need to delve into phenomenologyand ontology. I draw a fundamental distinction in ontology among the form,appearance, and substrate of any entity. Applying this three-facet ontology toconsciousness, we distinguish: the intentionality of consciousness ,the way we experience consciousness ,and the physical, biological, and cultural basis of consciousness .We can thus show how these very different aspects of consciousness fit togetherin a fundamental ontology. And we can thereby define the proper domains ofphenomenology and other disciplinesthat contribute to our understanding of consciousness

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David Smith
St. Francis Xavier University

Citations of this work

Mind as an horizon of sense.Giuseppe Mininni - 2009 - World Futures 65 (2):111 – 125.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Rediscovery of the Mind.John R. Searle - 1992 - MIT Press. Edited by Ned Block & Hilary Putnam.

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