Some thoughts on terrorism, moral complaint, and the self-reflexive and relational nature of morality

Philosophia 34 (1):65-74 (2006)
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Abstract

The contemporary discussion of terrorism has been dominated by deontological and consequentialist arguments. Building upon my previous work on a paradox concerning moral complaint, I try to broaden the perspectives through which we view the issues. The direction that seems to me as most promising is a self-reflexive, conditional, and, to some extent, relational emphasis. What one is permitted to do to others would depend not so much on some absolute code constraning actions or on the estimate of what would optimize overall the resulting well-being but on the precedents that the past actions of those others provided, on the relationships among the participants, on tacit or explicit offers and possible agreements among them, and on the reciprocity (or lack thereof) that ensues.

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Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

Should We Sacrifice the Utilitarians First?Saul Smilansky - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):850-867.

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References found in this work

Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2001 - Mind 110 (437):271-274.
Free Will and Illusion.Saul Smilansky - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):222-229.
The paradox of moral complaint.Saul Smilansky - 2006 - Utilitas 18 (3):284-290.

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