Analysis 76 (1):55-69 (2016)

Declan Smithies
Ohio State University
In his book, On Reflection, Hilary Kornblith criticizes what he regards as a chronic tendency in philosophy towards inflating the significance of reflection in ways that manifest a combination of philosophical naiveté and scientific ignorance about how reflection actually works. In these comments, I respond to Kornblith's challenge by sketching an account of the philosophical significance of reflection in the theory of epistemic justification.
Keywords reflection  epistemic justification  epistemic responsibility  epistemic internalism  animal knowledge  hilary kornblith
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anv032
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References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Empirical Knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.

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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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