Abstract

This dissertation comprises five chapters on the metaphysics of persistence, persons and vagueness. Chapter one investigates extant formulations of the two main competing views about persistence, viz., endurantism and perdurantism. These formulations are criticized on the grounds that they fail to satisfy certain desiderata for accounts of endurantism and perdurantism. Novel formulations of endurantism and perdurantism are provided, formulations that satisfy all of the desiderata. ;Chapter two argues against perdurantism. It is argued that if perdurantism is true, then human persons fail to have mental properties. Since they do have such properties, perdurantism is false. It is also argued that if perdurantism is true, then either human persons are not causally efficacious or human persons are causally redundant. Since both and are unacceptable, perdurantism is unacceptable. The chapter concludes with a discussion of an alleged third account of persistence, the stage theory. The stage theory while immune to the above objections is argued to be implausible and not a distinct account of persistence. ;Chapter three defends endurantism against some prominent reasons for accepting perdurantism. The problem of change is considered as well as objections based on paradoxes of material coincidence. Objections from the theory of special relativity are also addressed. It is argued that none of these objections poses a serious threat to endurantism. ;Chapters four and five, address issues at the intersection of the metaphysics of persons, vagueness, composition, and persistence. Chapter four develops an argument---the Vague Singulars Argument---for the conclusion that human persons are not composite material objects and focuses on the argument's implications for the nature of vagueness. ;Chapter five applies the Vague Singulars Argument to vagueness arguments for unrestricted composition and perdurantism. It is argued that if the Vague Singulars Argument is unsound, then the vagueness arguments for unrestricted composition and perdurantism are unsound. In addition, it is argued that if the Vague Singulars Argument is sound, then the vagueness argument for perdurantism is unsound. The vagueness argument for perdurantism, then, is simply unsound. This serves to defend endurantism against another influential objection