Political deliberation and the challenge of bounded rationality
Politics, Philosophy and Economics 13 (3):269-291 (2014)
Abstract
Many proponents of deliberative democracy expect reasonable citizens to engage in rational argumentation. However, this expectation runs up against findings by behavioral economists and social psychologists revealing the extent to which normal cognitive functions are influenced by bounded rationality. Individuals regularly utilize an array of biases in the process of making decisions, which inhibits our argumentative capacities by adversely affecting our ability and willingness to be self-critical and to give due consideration to others’ interests. Although these biases cannot be overcome, I draw on scientifically corroborated insights offered by Adam Smith to show that they can be kept in check if certain affective and cognitive capacities are cultivated. Smith provides a compelling account of how to foster sympathetic, impartial, and projective role-taking in the process of interacting with others, which can greatly enhance our capacity and willingness to critically assess our own interests and fairly consider those of othersAuthor's Profile
DOI
10.1177/1470594x13488355
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Citations of this work
Democratic deliberation, respect and personal storytelling.Valeria Ottonelli - 2017 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 20 (5):601-618.
Societal Rationality: Bounded or Embedded?Michael J. DeMoor - 2019 - Philosophia Reformata 84 (2):171-193.
References found in this work
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights.Will Kymlicka - 1995 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.