Naïve Expertise: Spacious Alternative to the Standard Account of Method

Philosophy of Management 9 (3):95-133 (2010)
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Abstract

The standard account of method (SAM) describes business and management research as a choice between “two traditions”: “qualitative “phenomenological” interpretivism” and “quantitative ‘scientific’ positivism”; each the enemy of the other. Students assemble “advantages and disadvantages” of each, pledge their allegiance, or a preference for “mixed method” (wishing for a “truce” in the “paradigm war”). In our increasingly Fordist academies, these variants attract grade-weightings of typically 20%, defined by “marking schemes” which are also standardised. Fordism is the management strategy of standardisation, deskilling, low unit-cost, simple assembly and central control. We argue that SAM “Fordises” the intellect and confounds our experience that inquiry entails the greatest customisation humanly possible. Moreover, unlike Ford’s River Rouge plant, SAM is plagued by faults: thousands of category mistakes caused by collapsing unrelated methodological dimensions into one simple-looking yet multiply mistaken dichotomy. Happily, natural language facilitates myriad methodological distinctions which untutored inquirers articulate with more facility, pluralism and precision than SAM. By providing better labelling for their easy instincts, naïve inquirers can recognise and revel in what they did not know.

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Citations of this work

Against the So-called ‘Standard Account of Method’.Rod Thomas - 2014 - Philosophy of Management 13 (1):43-72.
Editorial: Care, Mufti, and the Instrumental Turn.Paul Griseri - 2014 - Philosophy of Management 13 (1):1-4.

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