Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):43-71 (1975)

Abstract
Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects
Keywords Analytic Philosophy
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0165-9227
DOI 10.5840/gps197514
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,265
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Indexical Sense and Reference.David Woodruff Smith - 1981 - Synthese 49 (1):101 - 127.
Is This a Dagger I See Before Me?David Woodruff Smith - 1983 - Synthese 54 (January):95-114.
Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl Vis-À-Vis Early Wittgenstein.David Woodruff Smith - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement):153-180.
Guises and Their Existence.Alberto Voltolini - 1996 - Axiomathes 7 (3):419-434.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Meinong, Alexius; I: Meinongian Semantics.William J. Rapaport - 1991 - In Hans Burkhardt & Barry Smith (eds.), Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology. Philosophia Verlag. pp. 516-519.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Meinong’s Concept of Implexive Being and Nonbeing.Dale Jacquette - 1995 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 50 (1):233-271.
Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological Ontology.William J. Rapaport - 1985 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1):61-95.
Reference and Meinongian Objects.Daniel Hunter - 1981 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 14 (1):23-36.
A Meinongian Analysis of Fictional Objects.Terence Parsons - 1975 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):73-86.
An "Indifferent Presentation".Tim Rode - 1987 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 29 (1):129-143.
Who is Afraid of Imaginary Objects?Gabriele Contessa - 2009 - In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "On Denoting". Routledge.
Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-04-04

Total views
30 ( #381,313 of 2,507,661 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,871 of 2,507,661 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes