Grazer Philosophische Studien 1 (1):43-71 (1975)
Abstract |
Meinong's object theory is primarily motivated by the needs of intentionality theory. I argue that Meinongian objects must be intensional entities if, as asked, they are to serve as the objects of thought in a purely object-theoretic account of intentionality. For Meinong, incomplete objects are the proper objects of thought. Complete objects are beyond our grasp; we apprehend them as best we can when we intend incomplete objects embedded in them. This yields, on a semantic plane, an account of failures or substitutivity of identity in intentional contexts. And this, I argue, forces incomplete objects to be intensional, and so therefore are complete objects
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Keywords | Analytic Philosophy |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
ISBN(s) | 0165-9227 |
DOI | 10.5840/gps197514 |
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Intentionality and Picturing: Early Husserl Vis-À-Vis Early Wittgenstein.David Woodruff Smith - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (Supplement):153-180.
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