Methodological naturalism and its misconceptions

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 82 (3):321-336 (2017)
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Abstract

Methodological naturalism has been defended on both intrinsic and pragmatic grounds. Both of these defenses agree that methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which the scientist ought to eschew talk of causally efficacious disembodied minds. I argue that this is the wrong interpretation of methodological naturalism. Methodological naturalism does not constrain the theories that scientists may conjecture, but how those theories may be justified. On this view, methodological naturalism is a principle of science according to which supernatural methods of justification, such as faith, are eschewed.

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Citations of this work

Methodological naturalism in the sciences.Sandy C. Boucher - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (1):57-80.
Naturalism or Ontological Significance? Physicalism and Fundamental Mentality: A Historical Approach.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 16 (38):154-185.

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