Is Evaluative Compositionality a Requirement of Rationality?

Mind 123 (490):457-502 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper presents a new solution to the problems for orthodox decision theory posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives. I argue that a key question raised by consideration of these gambles is whether evaluative compositionality (as I term it) is a requirement of rationality: is the value that an ideally rational agent places on a gamble determined by the values that she places on its possible outcomes, together with their mode of composition into the gamble (i.e. the probabilities assigned to them)? The paper first outlines a certain simple response to the Pasadena game and identifies two problems with this response, the second of which is that it leads to a wholesale violation of evaluative compositionality. I then argue that rationality does not require decision makers to factor in outcomes of arbitrarily low probability. A method for making decisions which flows from this basic idea is then developed, and it is shown that this decision method (Truncation) leads to a limited — as opposed to wholesale — violation of evaluative compositionality. The paper then argues that the truncation method yields solutions to the problems posed by the Pasadena game and its relatives that are both attractive in themselves and superior to those yielded by alternative proposals in the literature.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,283

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hybrid Extensional Prototype Compositionality.Jussi Jylkkä - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (1):41-56.
Why Rationalist Compositionality Won't Go Away (Either).Víctor M. Verdejo - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):29-47.
Perplexing expectations.Alan Hájek & Harris Nover - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):703 - 720.
Why rationalist compositionality won't go away (either).Víctor Martín Verdejo Aparicio - 2009 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 24 (1):29-47.
Is Compositionality a Trivial Principle?Richard Heck - 2013 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 8 (1):140-55.
Concept empiricism, content, and compositionality.Collin Rice - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (3):567-583.
Is the Enkratic Principle a Requirement of Rationality?Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):436-462.


Added to PP

84 (#201,811)

6 months
11 (#245,306)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas J. J. Smith
University of Sydney

References found in this work

Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Truth and probability.Frank Ramsey - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 52-94.
Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.

View all 19 references / Add more references