Husserl's theory of the phenomenological reduction in the logical investigations

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (3):433-437 (1979)
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Abstract

Husserl conceived of the "reduction" in the "logical investigations" in a different manner than he conceived of it in his later works. In this book, The "reduction" is not a bracketing of the empirical ego so as to attain a self-Enclosed transcendental ego with its intentional acts, Hyletic data, And noemata. Rather it is a reduction that proceeds in part through an adequate inner perception, And in part through recollection and "empirical assumption," and which results in an empirical ego that is nothing more than the synthetic unity of its intentional acts and hyletic data

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God in recent French phenomenology.J. Aaron Simmons - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):910-932.

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