Choice-egalitarianism and the paradox of the baseline: A reply to Manor

Analysis 65 (4):333–337 (2005)
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Abstract

I made two claims against CE. First, that under careful analysis, CE compels us to bring about states of affairs so unacceptable that the position becomes absurd. By virtue of its very conceptual structure, CE gives us manifestly wrong instructions. Second, that CE’s hope of reconciling a strong egalitarianism with robust personal choice and something like the prevailing market economy is a chimera. Manor’s paper does not dispute my second claim. Indeed, his own claim, that in fact CE leads to something close to strict equality, supports my pessimism about CE’s reconciliation project. My reply to Manor therefore focuses on his denial of my first claim, that choice-egalitarianism leads to absurdity.

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Saul Smilansky
University of Haifa

Citations of this work

How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?Gerald Lang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):698-722.

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