Abandoning the Dead Donor Rule

Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (10):707-714 (2023)
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Abstract

The Dead Donor Rule is intended to protect the public and patients, but it remains contentious. Here, I argue that we can abandon the Dead Donor Rule. Using Joel Feinberg’s account of harm, I argue that, in most cases, particularly when patients consent to being organ donors, death does not harm permanently unconscious (PUC) patients. In these cases, then, causing the death of PUC patients is not morally wrong. This undermines the strongest argument for the Dead Donor Rule—that doctors ought not kill their patients. Thus, there is nothing wrong with abandoning the Dead Donor Rule with regard to PUC patients. Importantly, the harm-based argument defended here allows us to sidestep the thorny debate surrounding definitions of death. What matters is not when a patient dies but whether their death constitutes some further harm.

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References found in this work

Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
Some puzzles about the evil of death.Fred Feldman - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):205-227.
Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming.Joel Feinberg - 1986 - Social Philosophy and Policy 4 (1):145.
Harm.Michael Rabenberg - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-32.
What makes killing wrong?Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Franklin G. Miller - 2013 - Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1):3-7.

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