A Plea for Things That Are Not Quite All There: Or, Is There a Problem about Vague Composition and Vague Existence?

Journal of Philosophy 102 (8):381-421 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Orthodoxy has it that mereological composition can never be a vague matter, for if it were, then existence would sometimes be a vague matter too, and that's impossible. I accept that vague composition implies vague existence, but deny that either is impossible. In this paper I develop degree-theoretic versions of quantified modal logic and of mereology, and combine them in a framework that allows us to make clear sense of vague composition and vague existence, and the relationships between them

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,168

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Introduction.Nick Smith - 1952 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 1:5-19.
Vagueness and Existence.Katherine Hawley - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):125-140.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
390 (#51,832)

6 months
27 (#111,271)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicholas J. J. Smith
University of Sydney

Citations of this work

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Ordinary objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Location and Mereology.Cody Gilmore, Claudio Calosi & Damiano Costa - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Argument from Vagueness.Daniel Z. Korman - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):891-901.

View all 29 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Mereology.Achille C. Varzi - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
On being in the same place at the same time.David Wiggins - 1968 - Philosophical Review 77 (1):90-95.
Constitution is not identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):89-106.
Constitution Is Not Identity.Mark Johnston - 1992 - In Michael C. Rea (ed.), Material Constitution. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 44-62.
A two-dimensional passage model of time for time travel.Jack W. Meiland - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (3-4):153 - 173.

Add more references