Abstract

I. Eth. Nic. III. c. I, § 16. In spite of what Bernays and others have done to clear up this chapter, many perplexities remain. To some of these I propose later to return, but here I confine myself to one. Among the possible circumstances of an act, ignorance of which is excusable and may excuse, is enumerated τò ο νεκα. Nothing but desperation could have led the commentators to suggest that here τò ο νεκα means the actual effect or result of the act . It may be sufficient to quote the notes ad loc. of these two scholars: 1. Stewart: ‘The o νεκα here is not, as usual, the intention of the doer, for he cannot be ignorant of what he intends to do; but the outcome or result of what he actually does, which is the opposite of the intention.’