Hypertemporal Humeanism and the Open Future

Take strong open-future Humeanism (OFH) to comprise the following three tenets: (i) that truth supervenes on being (ii) that there is a dynamic present moment, and (iii) that there are no future facts; that is, contingent propositions about the future obtain truth values only when their referents are actualised (Tooley 1997). On the face of it this is a deeply problematic metaphysic - if there are no future facts then prima facie the Humean can neither provide laws of nature, nor explain the evolution of physical systems, as the Humean takes truths (including nomological truths) to supervene on the omnitemporal mosaic of local particular matters of fact. Hypertemporal Humeanism (HH), the view I propose in this paper, admits of nomological facts whilst granting the ontological and conceptual commitments of OFH. HH provides a coherent account of laws of nature, and (unlike standard Humean conceptions) accommodates the natural intuition that future facts are yet to be determined. Furthermore, although the view arguably struggles to combat the problem of induction, the Hypertemporal Humean is in no worse a position in this respect than the traditional closed-future Humean metaphysics.
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