Did Searle attack strong strong AI or weak strong AI?

Abstract

John Searle's attack on the Strong AI thesis, and the published replies, are all based on a failure to distinguish two interpretations of that thesis, a strong one, which claims that the mere occurrence of certain process patterns will suffice for the occurrence of mental states, and a weak one which requires that the processes be produced in the right sort of way. Searle attacks strong strong AI, while most of his opponents defend weak strong AI. This paper explores some of Searle's concepts and shows that there are interestingly different versions of the 'Strong AI' thesis, connected with different kinds of reliability of mechanisms and programs.

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2009-01-28

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Aaron Sloman
University of Birmingham

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