Conscious intending as self-programming

Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113 (2015)
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Abstract

Despite the fact that there is considerable evidence against the causal efficacy of proximal (short-term) conscious intentions, many studies confirm our commonsensical belief in the efficacy of more distal (longer-term) conscious intentions. In this paper, I address two questions: (i) What, if any, is the difference between the role of consciousness in effective and in non-effective conscious intentions? (ii) How do effective conscious distal intentions interact with unconscious processes in producing actions, and how do non-effective proximal intentions fit into this process? I argue that answers to these questions point to a picture of distal conscious intending as a form of self-programming. The metaphor of ?self-programming? will be elucidated by using a distinction between ?structuring? and ?triggering? causes. Though the self-programming metaphor does not amount to a full theory of conscious intending, I argue that it may be a useful heuristic in developing such a theory. I also argue that the metaphor is phenomenologically plausible

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Marc Slors
Radboud University Nijmegen