On Asymptotic Strategy-Proofness of Classical Social Choice Rules

Theory and Decision 52 (4):389-398 (2002)
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Abstract

We show that, when the number of participating agents n tends to infinity, all classical social choice rules are asymptotically strategy -proof with the proportion of manipulable profiles being of order O

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Citations of this work

Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.

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References found in this work

Positionalist voting functions.Peter Gärdenfors - 1973 - Theory and Decision 4 (1):1-24.
A note on manipulability of large voting schemes.Bezalel Peleg - 1979 - Theory and Decision 11 (4):401-412.

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