Pragmatism, Theism, and the Viability of Metaphysical Realism

American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 87 (3):379-395 (2013)
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In this essay I present two cases for what I term an “unobjectionable” or weak version of metaphysical realism, the first based on a commitment to a version of pragmatism, and the second based on a commitment to theism. I argue that it can be reasonable to accept such a version of realism even if there are no arguments that definitively prove its truth, and that both pragmatists and theists have good reasons to accept it. Although I conceive of these grounds as independent lines of justification, I see no reason in principle why one could not hold both simultaneously. This is not to suggest that there are not versions of pragmatism or theism that are incompatible with each other, but rather only that pragmatism and theism as such are not mutually exclusive views



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