Analyse & Kritik 28 (1):99-101 (2006)
AbstractI raise a few questions about key points in the argument of Natural Jus- tice. 1. The pivotal role assigned to the theory of indefinitely repeated games appears to be both implausible and unnecessary. 2. The evolutionary foundations of the Nash bargaining solution are not completely secure, and its role in the account of interper- sonal comparisones of utility is questionable. 3. Free renegotiation behind the veil of ignorance appears neither to have an evolutionary rationale nor to be a brute fact about the way men are
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Collective Intentionality, Rationality, and Institutions.Ivan Mladenovic - 2014 - Rivista di Estetica 57:67-86.
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