Networks with Attitudes

Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470 (2007)
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Does connectionism spell doom for folk psychology? I examine the proposal that cognitive representational states such as beliefs can play no role if connectionist models - - interpreted as radical new cognitive theories -- take hold and replace other cognitive theories. Though I accept that connectionist theories are radical theories that shed light on cognition, I reject the conclusion that neural networks do not represent. Indeed, I argue that neural networks may actually give us a better working notion of cognitive representational states such as beliefs, and in so doing give us a better understanding of how these states might be instantiated in neural wetware.



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Paul Skokowski
Stanford University

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Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
Reality and representation.David Papineau - 1987 - New York: Blackwell.

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