Abstract
The climate of epistemological opinion is rapidly changing in the direction of an increasing concern with the substantive results of the empirical sciences of man, such as psychology and biology. This change is of a comparatively recent date: as late as in 1964, Chauncey Wright’s seminal speculations on the biology of knowledge-processes were shrugged off by one commentator as “nineteenth-century impedimenta and paraphernalia”. Today, such a judgment seems strangely out of date. Our knowledge of man as an animal has been broadened and deepened, both by the dramatic advances of molecular biology and by the recent appearance of the ‘sociobiology’ represented by Edward O. Wilson. To the philosopher, the question inevitably arises of how far this knowledge extends and, in particular, to what extent it can account for peculiarly human intellectual phenomena, such as the growth of scientific knowledge. The study of man as an animal and the study of man as a knower can no longer be simply assumed to be two distinct and separate departments of thought.