Abstract

Just fifteen years ago, the common non-religious consensus was that homosexual acts were immoral. Within one decade, however, this consensus waned. The secular majority no longer held, as they previously did, that such actions are morally bad. What explains this sudden change? One explanation is that many conservatives lacked adequate philosophical tools to explain the foundations of the earlier historical consensus. Another is that modern research has shown that there never existed any solid philosophical grounds for calling such actions immoral in the first place. This book questions the latter narrative; for prior to this book no exhaustive historical treatment of philosophical thought on the moral question of homosexual acts existed. Both liberals and conservatives failed to research adequately the long history of thought on this issue. The current author not only argues that the earlier non-religious philosophical consensus has largely been ignored, but that the proliferation of arguments in favor of acting on homosexual inclinations reveal a strong desire to justify what isn't possible to justify morally. The non-religious arguments of the great philosopher Thomas Aquinas are then examined; they reveal that his reasoning can soundly show that acting on homosexual inclinations is morally wrong, and also that the same argument rightly entails that every untruthful assertive speech act is morally problematic. If conservatives wish to be consistent, they ought to reject lying too. And if liberals expect conservatives to believe that what they preach is true, then they ought to stand with Aquinas and reject all lying as intrinsically evil.