Being Rational Enough: Maximizing, Satisficing, and Degrees of Rationality

Australasian Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Against the maximizing conception of practical rationality, Michael Slote has argued that rationality does not always require choosing what is most rational. Instead, it can sometimes be rational to do something that is less-than-fully rational. In this paper, I will argue that maximizers have a ready response to Slote’s position. Roy Sorensen has argued that ‘rational’ is an absolute term, suggesting that it is not possible to be rational without being completely rational. Sorensen’s view is confirmed by the fact that, by the lights of contemporary linguistics, ‘rational’ is an absolute gradable adjective. Because ‘rational’ is an absolute gradable adjective, being rational requires being at the top of the scale of rationality, making anyone who is not fully rational positively irrational. Contra Slote, the only way to be rational enough is to be maximally rational.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,199

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Why ethical satisficing makes sense and rational satisficing doesn't.James Dreier - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 131-154.
Satisficing rationality: In praise of folly. [REVIEW]Grant Brown - 1992 - Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (2):261-269.
Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.
Two views of satisficing.Michael Slote - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 14--29.
A new defense of satisficing.Michael Weber - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 77--106.
Satisficing: Not good enough.Henry S. Richardson - 2004 - In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing: Moral Theorists on Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 106--130.
Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.
Resting content: Sensible satisficing?Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):305 - 317.

Analytics

Added to PP
2021-10-08

Downloads
37 (#317,535)

6 months
9 (#95,670)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Wes Siscoe
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references