The Official Doctrine and its Relevance Today

PARISHEELAN (No.3):14-21 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX


It is the intention of this paper is to introduce some contemporary relevance of Descartes’ dualism with special reference to Gilbert Ryle’s criticism. Ryle’s explicit target in The Concept of Mind is what he calls the “official doctrine”, which results, he tells us, at least in part from Descartes’ appreciation that Galilean methods of scientific discovery were fit to provide mechanical explanations for every occupant of space, together with Descartes’ conviction that the mental could not simply be a more complex variety of the mechanical. Whether or not every aspect of the resulting “two-world” view is properly attributed to Descartes. It is familiar view, which has widely become known as Cartesianism in Anglo-American philosophy. It has distinctive ontological and epistemological commitments.



External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Ryle’s Dispositional Analysis of Mind and its Relevance.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2010 - Review Journal of Philosophy and Social Sciences (April, 2010):103-112.
Platonic Dualism.L. P. Gerson - 1986 - The Monist 69 (3):352-369.
GILBERRT RYLE ON DESCARTES' MYTH.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2007 - K.U. Research Journal of Arts and Humanities (Jan.-Dec.2007):81-86.
The Explorations of Descartes and Ryle’s Idea of Mind: An Appraisal.Mishra R. - 2023 - Philosophy International Journal 6 (3):1-5.
Dualism.David M. Rosenthal - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge.
Philosophical Mind Studies.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2010 - Dissertation, Kurukshetra University, Kurukshetra


Added to PP

981 (#15,456)

6 months
331 (#7,414)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Desh Raj Sirswal
Panjab University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references