Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):278-299 (2015)

Neil Sinhababu
National University of Singapore
Nietzsche takes moral judgments to be false beliefs, and encourages us to pursue subjective nonmoral value arising from our passions. His view that strong and unified passions make one virtuous is mathematically derivable from this subjectivism and a conceptual analysis of virtue, explaining his evaluations of character and the nature of the Overman.
Keywords Nietzsche  subjectivism  virtue
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2015.1073576
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References found in this work BETA

Nicomachean Ethics.H. Aristotle & Rackham - 1968 - Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.
Nicomachean Ethics.Terence Irwin & Aristotle of Stagira - 1999 - Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.

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Nietzsche and Value Creation: Subjectivism, Self-Expression, and Strength.Harold Langsam - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (1):100-113.

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