Trivial Sacrifices, Great Demands

Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (1):3-15 (2010)
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Suppose that people in the affluent countries can easily save the lives of the starving needy in poor countries. Then, three points seem to follow. First, it is wrong for these people not to make the easy rescue . Second, it is wrong to stop making the easy rescue even if they have made many rescues already . Third, if we accept the first two points, the demands of morality are super-extreme. That is, people have to keep making trivial sacrifices until there is no more trivial sacrifices to make . Here, predictably, our commonsense will resist the third point. However, I argue in this paper that, since the first two points are harder to refute, we have to accept the third point anyway



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Citations of this work

The Demandingness of Morality: Toward a Reflective Equilibrium.Brian Berkey - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):3015-3035.
Sacrifices of Self.Vanessa Carbonell - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):53-72.
Altruism and Ambition in the Dynamic Moral Life.Tom Dougherty - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):716-729.
Relief from Rescue.Jordan Arthur Thomson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1221-1239.

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References found in this work

Intuitions and moral theorizing.Brad Hooker - 2002 - In Philip Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical Intuitionism: Re-Evaluations. Oxford University Press. pp. 76--161.

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