Analysis 77 (3):643-648 (
2017)
Copy
BIBTEX
Abstract
Nicholas Sturgeon memorably asked: ‘What difference does it make whether moral realism is true?’ His question was prompted by the rise of the metaethical upstart quasi-realism, which urges that an expressivist account of moral discourse is compatible with most, if not all, of its important contours. In his invigorating new book, Cuneo offers a startling new answer to Sturgeon’s question.1 If moral realism were not true, Cuneo argues, we would not be able to speak. But since we evidently can speak, moral realism must be true. So for Cuneo, the Hobbesian view that moral norms are the product of spoken contracts gets things quite the wrong way round: rather, the speech-act of contracting – like all illocutionary speech-acts – is partly the product of...