Philosophical Books 49 (3):193-196 (2008)

My book, Moral Skepticisms, is intended to serve as an introduction to moral epistemology as well as a development of my own moral epistemology. Hence, my opening chapter surveys the field of moral epistemology and the varieties of moral scepticism. The main lesson is that we should stop arguing about moral scepticism in general, because there are too many kinds that differ in too many important details.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0149.2008.00460.x
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