Phantasie, Recognition, Memory – Comparing Fichte And Hegel On Language

Minerva 5:94-117 (2001)
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Abstract

The author compares the linguistic philosophies of Fichte and Hegel, concluding that Hegel's position ismore comprehensive than Fichte's. Fichte and Hegel share essential suppositions about language andphilosophy, best seen in their remarks on Phantasie, schematism, and especially the idea of unity. The issueof recognition is the primary point of difference between them. Fichte sees man's desire for recognition inthe transformation of signs from visual to audible; for Hegel, however, man's desire forrecognition is prior to Fichte's placement of it. Whereas for Fichte, man desires to express his thoughts assoon as he realizes that another man is reasonable, for Hegel, man desires to objectify his thoughts, orvalue, at this moment. With this fundamental difference in their conceptions of recognition, Fichte andHegel end up with very different conceptions of language that reflect in some ways their differingconceptions of philosophy as a whole. The author closes by corroborating this finding through an analysisof their respective treatments of memory

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