Abstract

Compulsion and Surprise Two phenomena conspire to convince people that the physical world exists independently of them. One is its recalcitrance, or insusceptibility to control. It resists and constrains our actions. Much as we might wish to do so, we cannot lift heavy boulders, walk through walls, jump rivers, breathe under water, or fly (unaided) over mountains. The other feature, which is connected to the first, is the world’s propensity to surprise us. The sights and sound, pressures and pains of the world force themselves upon us in perception whether we want them to or not, and are often unexpected and surprising. An unusual bird appears in the garden, a stranger calls at the door and reveals he is a long-lost cousin, the post brings an invitation out of the blue, the car won’t start (surprises may be unpleasant as well as pleasant). These two phenomena, recalcitrance and surprise, form a large part of the platonist’s case for the existence of an independent mathematical reality. The recalcitrance of mathematical reality indeed appears to be stronger than that of the physical: the necessity with which mathematical results follow from assumptions is stricter than the physical necessity by which a wall resists attempts to walk through it. This has rarely been put more eloquently than by Jan Łukasiewicz. Speaking in particular of mathematical logic, he wrote..