Values, circumstances, and epistemic justification

Southern Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):373-391 (1993)
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Abstract

"Evidentialism" is the view that a person's epistemic justification for a doxastic attitude is determined entirely by his or her evidence for the content of that attitude. This paper has two goals. The first is to argue that values and circumstances properly influence epistemic justification, and that evidentialism is therefore untenable, even as an epistemic ideal. The second is to outline a nonevidentialist theory of epistemic justification that avoids the common objection that nonevidentialist theories fail to preserve important distinctions between epistemic justification, on the one hand, and moral and prudential justification, on the other hand

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Rosalind Simson
Mercer University

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