American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):397-410 (2015)

Christoph Kelp
University of Glasgow
According to the achievement account of the value of knowledge, knowledge is finally valuable because it is a species of a finally valuable genus, achievement. The achievement account is said to solve Pritchard's tertiary value problem, the problem of showing that knowledge enjoys a different kind of value than mere true belief. This paper argues, first, that AA fails to solve TVP, and, second, that Pritchard's motivations for TVP are inadequate. They do, however, motivate a weaker value problem, one that can be solved by showing that knowledge is weakly superior to mere true belief. Finally, third, we argue that knowledge does enjoy this form of weak superiority. Since this argument rests on AA's key species-genus claim, AA can retain the upper hand in the debate.
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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