Three questions for minimalism

Synthese 195 (3):1011-1034 (2018)
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Abstract

In this paper, I raise some interconnected concerns for Paul Horwich’s minimal theory of truth, framed by these three questions: How should the minimal theory be formulated? How does the minimal theory address the liar paradox? What is the explanatory role of the concept of truth? I conclude that we cannot be linguistic or conceptual deflationists about truth.

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10.1007/s11229-016-1135-8

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Keith Simmons
University of Connecticut

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References found in this work

Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Posthumous Writings.Gottlob Frege (ed.) - 1979 - Blackwell.

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