Sosa on Permissible Suspension and the Proper Remit of the Theory of Knowledge

Res Philosophica 99 (4):453-466 (2022)
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10.11612/resphil.2138

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Mona Simion
University of Glasgow

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To the Best of Our Knowledge: Social Expectations and Epistemic Normativity.Sanford Goldberg (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Dispositions.Shungho Choi & Michael Fara - 2012 - The Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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