Howard Simmons
McMaster University (PhD)
My subject is the theory of blame recently propounded by George Sher in his book, In Praise of Blame. I argue that although Sher has succeeded in capturing a number of genuine features of the concept of blame, there is an important element that he has omitted, which is the fact that necessarily, when A blames B for something and expresses this to B, A will realise that B is likely to find this unpleasant. The inclusion of the latter element renders the question of whether any agent ever deserves blame a more open one than Sher allows.
Keywords Blame  Moral responsibility  Determinism  Desert  Sher
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