MacBride on truth in truthmaking

Analysis 76 (1):19-26 (2016)
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Abstract

Fraser MacBride has argued that deflationism about truth makes the truthmaker principle, that every truth has a truthmaker, implausible. This is because on a deflationary view, the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of a conjunction of claims which have no independent motivation. In this article, I argue that this claim is false: deflationism does not entail that the truthmaker principle is a mere abbreviation of such a conjunction, because the claims MacBride focuses on are in fact irrelevant to the motivations for truthmaker theory. Moreover, deflationists can consistently articulate and accept such motivations. Deflationism has no bearing on the plausibility of the truthmaker principle

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Matthew Simpson
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

The best thing about the deflationary theory of truth.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):109-131.
Deflationism and truthmaking.Matthew Simpson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3157-3181.

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References found in this work

Conceptions of truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
Truthmakers.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):186–200.

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