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Epistemic Norm Correspondence and the Belief–Assertion Parallel
Analysis:any048 (2018)
Abstract
Several prominent philosophers assume that the so-called ‘Belief–Assertion Parallel’ warrants epistemic norm correspondence; as such, they argue from the epistemic norm governing one to the epistemic norm governing the other. This paper argues that, in all its readings, the belief–assertion parallel lacks the desired normative import.Author's Profile
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2018-08-14
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Citations of this work
Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2018 - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
Saying and believing: the norm commonality assumption.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):1951-1966.
References found in this work
Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.
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