Abstract
Jay Elliott considers Aristotle’s view on the voluntariness of virtue and vice in his Nicomachean Ethics III.5 by exploring two rival interpretations. According to Elliott, the libertarian reading emphasizes the freedom that mature agents have to change their characters after rational reflection but neglects the role that upbringing plays in character formation. In contrast, the compatibilist reading stresses the agents’ upbringing in shaping their beliefs and desires. Elliott explains that because compatibilists maintain that agents’ actions stem from their own beliefs and desires, their actions, which reveal their character, are voluntary. Nevertheless, Elliott holds that because the agents, for the compatibilists, lack the power to change their beliefs and desires, the compatibilist account downplays the voluntariness of character in Aristotle’s own view. Elliott criticizes these rival interpretations and focuses on the concept of “practice” to argue that Aristotle’s view of character is both voluntary and subject to one’s upbringing. I discuss Aristotle’s concepts of voluntariness and practice in evaluating Elliott’s interpretation.