At odds with the truth

Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):548-550 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

> The bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be. What he does necessarily attempt to deceive us about is his enterprise. His only indispensably distinctive characteristic is that in a certain way he misrepresents what he is up to. 1 - Harry Frankfurt In both lying and truth-telling, the speaker intends the audience to believe what she says is true; that her enterprise is to inform her audience. In contrast, the speaker who bullshits doesn’t care whether the audience believes what she says, rather she intends her audience to believe or do something else—to think highly of her, to buy what she is selling, or the like. I argue that nudging is incompatible with securing genuine informed consent.2 I assume, but do not argue, that informed consent requires truth-telling during adequate disclosure. When a physician nudges, her intention is to irrationally influence her patient’s choice, not inform. Because of this, nudging cannot be understood as truth-telling ; rather it is essentially bullshit.1 In " Truth be told," Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby and Peter A Ubel argue that not all nudging is incompatible with truth-telling, contending that ‘nudges can be bullshit,’ but that ‘nudging does not require bullshitting.’3 They ask us to consider the following: Vaccination: Consider a physician who wants her patient to get a vaccine. She tells him why the vaccine is important, by providing factually correct information about the vaccine. In other words, she engages in informed disclosure aimed at enhancing the patient’s understanding. At the same time, she also tells the patient that the majority of people his age get the vaccine. In other words, she engages in nudging the patient by …

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Truth Pluralism, Truth Relativism and Truth-aptness.Michael P. Lynch - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158.
Hobbes's contempt for opinions: Manipulation and the challenge for mass democracies.Geoffrey M. Vaughan - 1999 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 13 (1-2):55-71.
Truth and provability: A comment on Redhead.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):611-613.
Beauty, odds, and credence.Masahiro Yamada - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1247-1261.
A few puzzles about William James' theory of truth.Xingming Hu - 2016 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 57 (135):803-821.
The concept of truth.Richard Campbell - 2011 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Nietzsche, Truth, and the Horror of Existence.Philip J. Kain - 2006 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 23 (1):41 - 58.
On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.
Deflationary Truth and Truth-Biology.Margo Laasberg - 2008 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):265-283.
Truth and Truth-Making.E. Jonathan Lowe & Adolf Rami - 2008 - Montreal: Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
»Doing truth« Bausteine einer Praxeologie der Wahrheit.Bernhard Kleeberg & Robert Suter - 2014 - Zeitschrift für Kulturphilosophie 2014 (2):211-226.

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-04-19

Downloads
21 (#718,251)

6 months
8 (#342,364)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Nudging and Informed Consent.Shlomo Cohen - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics 13 (6):3-11.
Nudging, informed consent and bullshit.William Simkulet - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (8):536-542.

View all 11 references / Add more references