A Berry and A Russell Without Self-Reference

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):253-261 (2005)
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Abstract

In this paper I present two new paradoxes, a definability paradox (related to the paradoxes of Berry, Richard and König), and a paradox about extensions (related to Russell’s paradox). However, unlike the familiar definability paradoxes and Russell’s paradox, these new paradoxes involve no self-reference or circularity.

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Keith Simmons
University of Connecticut

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Unified Grounding.Casper Storm Hansen - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (5):993-1010.

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References found in this work

Paradox without Self-Reference.Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Analysis 53 (4):251-252.
Paradoxes of denotation.Keith Simmons - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 76 (1):71 - 106.

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