Abstract

In this dissertation, I defend Alan Gewirth's theory of ethical rationalism, as it appears in his Reason and Morality , against a variety of objections. According to Gewirth's theory, a supreme moral principle, the Principle of Generic Consistency , can be justified in such a way that any rational agent who denies it falls into a logical contradiction, and all more particular moral truths can be justified by appeal to the PGC. ;I first lay out Gewirth's argument to the PGC and argue against some criticisms of the argument's logical structure. Then, in the bulk of the dissertation, I turn to a defense of the conceptual validity, and corresponding reality, of the 'rational agency' which undergirds Gewirth's argument. With respect to rationality, I first defend Gewirth's central use of the principle of noncontradiction and then argue against the practical rationality of logical irrationality. Then, in my lengthier account of Gewirthian agency, I first argue against various forms of compatibilism, and then develop an alternative libertarian theory of freedom. Finally, I discuss some problems relating to the application of Gewirth's PGC.