“Was you ever bit by a dead bee?” – Evolutionary games and dominated strategies

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):175-176 (2003)
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Abstract

On top of the puzzles mentioned by Colman comes the puzzle of why rationality has bewitched classical game theory for so long. Not the smallest merit of evolutionary game theory is that it views rationality as a limiting case, at best. But some problems only become more pressing.

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Karl Sigmund
University of Vienna

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