The role of perception in demonstrative reference

Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-21 (2002)
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Abstract

Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.

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2009-01-28

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

Citations of this work

Context, content, and relativism.Michael Glanzberg - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):93-117.
A Defence of Intentionalism about Demonstratives.Alex Radulescu - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 775-791.
Shifty characters.Eliot Michaelson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):519-540.
On the evolution of conscious attention.Harry Haroutioun Haladjian & Carlos Montemayor - 2015 - Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 22 (3):595-613.

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