Naturalism, Instrumental Rationality and the Normativity of Epistemology

ProtoSociology 8:97-110 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Advocates of naturalized epistemology who wish to secure epistemology’s normativity want that normativity to be restricted to instrumental concerns, because these can be understood naturalistically. But epistemic normativity cannot be so limited; a ‘categorical’ sort of normativity must be acknowledged. Naturalism can neither account for nor do away with this sort of normativity. Hence naturalism is at best a seriously incomplete and therefore inadequate meta-epistemological position.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Hypothetical and Categorical Epistemic Normativity.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):273-290.
Naturalism and the normativity of epistemology.James Maffie - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 59 (3):333 - 349.
Naturalistic Epistemologies and A Priori Justification.Lisa Warenski - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski & Konrad Kalmont-Taminski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
Naturalistic Epistemologies and Normativity.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2002 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 2 (3):299-317.
Normativity in Quine's naturalism: The technology of truth-seeking? [REVIEW]Wybo Houkes - 2002 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 33 (2):251-267.
Epistemic rationality as instrumental rationality: A critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
The special status of instrumental reasons.Stephanie Beardman - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):255 - 287.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-31

Downloads
42 (#388,607)

6 months
12 (#241,878)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references