Empirical psychology, naturalized epistemology, and first philosophy

Philosophy of Science 51 (4):667-676 (1984)
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Abstract

In his 1983 article, Paul A. Roth defends the Quinean project of naturalized epistemology from the criticism presented in my 1980 article. In this note I would like to respond to Roth's effort. I will argue that, while helpful in advancing and clarifying the issues, Roth's defense of naturalized epistemology does not succeed. The primary topic to be clarified is Quine's "no first philosophy" doctrine; but I will address myself to other points as well

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Citations of this work

Laudan's normative naturalism.Harvey Siegel - 1990 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (2):295-313.
Neurath's programme for naturalistic epistemology.Thomas E. Uebel - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):623-646.
Normative epistemology and naturalized epistemology.Harold I. Brown - 1988 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):53 – 78.

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References found in this work

Epistemic Merit, Intrinsic and Instrumental.Roderick Firth - 1981 - Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 55 (1):5-23.
Siegel on naturalized epistemology and natural science.Paul A. Roth - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (3):482-493.

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