Can Selection Effects on Experience Influence its Rational Role?

Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper explores two kinds of selection effects on perception by the subject’s own psychological states, such as desires, fears, or beliefs. Such states can influence the selection of objects for perceptual experience, or they can influence the selection of perceptual experience for uptake in the process of belief-formation. It is argued that both kinds of selection effects are rationally assessable, even when the subject is not aware of their influence on the selection.

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10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199672707.003.0009

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Susanna Siegel
Harvard University

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