Ratio 34 (1):7-19 (2021)

Authors
Nader Shoaibi
Gonzaga University
Abstract
The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide-scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements.
Keywords coherence norms  aim of truth  normativity of logic  epistemic utility theory  veritism
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DOI 10.1111/rati.12289
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References found in this work BETA

The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.
Logical Pluralism.Jc Beall & Greg Restall - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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